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Sammendrag: Energisparekontrakter (EPCer) har vist 
seg å være en effektiv mekanisme for å øke 
energieffektiviteten i nesten alle sektorer av 
økonomien siden de ble introdusert for nesten 30 år 
siden. I sin moderne form planlegges og gjennomføres 
EPC av eksperter med spesialisert teknisk kunnskap 
og finansieres av kommersielle långivere. EPC 
muliggjør reduksjon av risiko og bruk av tid og 
ressurser for å oppnå energisparing for byggeier.  
Denne rapporten gir en oversikt over erfaringer fra 
USA når det gjelder EPC og diskuterer muligheter og 
barrierer for bruk av EPC i boligsektoren hvor EPC 
nærmest har vært fraværende. Boligsektoren varierer 
på flere viktige måter fra de markedssegmenter hvor 
EPC har hatt suksess. Faktorer som høy grad av 
heterogenitet i energibruken, relativt lite energiforbruk 
per bolig, begrenset tilgang til informasjon om 
energiforbruk og innsparingspotensial og 
markedsineffektivitet som begrenser verdien av 
effektiviseringstiltak har stått i veien for bruk av EPC i 
boligsektoren.  Imidlertid kan kombinasjonen av nye 
teknologiske fremskritt ved automatisert 
målingssystemer, fleksible finansieringsalternativer og 
en økt inkludering av energieffektiviseringsløsninger 
som en del av konkurransen i energimarkedet bidra til 
at EPC liknende løsninger kan benyttes også i 
boligsektoren.   
   
Abstract: Energy performance contracts (EPCs) have 
proven an effective mechanism for increasing energy 
efficiency in nearly all sectors of the economy since 
their introduction nearly 30 years ago. In the modern 
form, activities undertaken as part of an EPC are 
scoped and implemented by experts with specialized 
technical knowledge, financed by commercial lenders, 
and enable a facility owner to limit risk and 
investment of time and resources while receiving the 
rewards of improved energy performance. This report 
provides a review of the experiences of the US with 
EPCs and discusses the possibilities for the residential 
sector to utilize EPCs. Notably absent from the EPC 
market is the residential segment. Historically, 
research has shown that the residential sector varies in 
several key ways from markets segments where EPCs 
have proven successful, including: high degree of 
heterogeneity of energy use characteristics among and 
within households, comparatively small quantity of 
energy consumed per residence, limited access to 
information about energy consumption and savings 
potential, and market inefficiencies that constrain the 
value of efficiency measures. However, the 
combination of recent technological advances in 
automated metering infrastructure, flexible financing 
options, and the expansion of competitive wholesale 
electricity markets to include energy efficiency as a 
biddable supply-side resource present an opportunity 
for EPC-like efforts to successfully engage the 
residential sector, albeit following a different model 
than has been used in EPCs traditionally. 
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I. Purpose 
This report is intended to provide insight into energy performance contracts (EPCs) in the United States. 
by addressing the following questions: 
- To what extent are EPCs being implemented in the municipal and residential sectors in the U.S.? 
o How are EPCs being implemented in these sectors? 
o What effect do EPCs have on the barriers and opportunities to realizing energy savings?  
 
- How are the energy performance contract markets serving these sectors organized, and in what 
manner are the incentives distributed in relation to the tasks and roles of participants?  
 
- How might EPCs be designed to obtain the largest energy savings effects? 
 
- What factors constrain the development of EPCs, and what conditions are most important for 
increasing the use of EPCs in these sectors? 
 
- In what way are smart meters, or automated metering systems, and other “smart grid” 
technologies used in combination with EPCs? 
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II. Introduction 
A. Terminology 
Given that the questions at hand focus on energy savings as an outcome of EPCs, we must ask what is 
meant by energy savings and how do energy savings differ from energy efficiency or energy 
conservation? These different terms are bandied about in “energy efficiency” literature, yet are at times 
used interchangeably, and at other times used in reference to specific concepts. In general, for the 
purposes of this report, these terms are differentiated as follows: 
Energy Conservation refers to absolute reductions in the quantity of energy consumption. For example, 
hanging laundry out on a line instead of drying it in a machine is a method of energy conservation. 
Energy Efficiency is a measure of the quantity of energy consumed to produce some output; increasing 
energy efficiency means that the same output is produced using a lower quantity of energy input. 
Replacing a clothes dryer that consumed 2 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per pound of wet laundry with one that 
only consumed 1 kWh per pound would increase energy efficiency. 
Energy Productivity is a measure of the economic efficiency of energy consumption, and incorporates the 
tradeoffs associated with how energy is used. Replacing a clothes dryer that consumed 2 kWh per pound 
of wet laundry during an hour-long operating cycle with one that consumed 2 kWh per pound during a 
half-hour-long drying cycle would increase energy productivity by reducing labor time and doubling the 
amount of laundry that could be done with the same equipment during the same period of time (ideally, of 
course, the replacement dryer would also be more energy efficient and use fewer kWh per pound of wet 
laundry). 
Energy Savings is a measure of the cost of energy, and incorporates both the price and quantity of energy 
consumed. For example, using a clothes dryer during off-peak hours (i.e., when demand for electricity is 
lowest) consumes lower-cost electricity and results in energy savings. 
B. Origin of the EPC 
Energy use in the modern societies of developed nations is ubiquitous and often taken for granted – until 
it’s not available. Recognition of energy as a resource of finite supply and of potentially limited 
availability was first institutionalized in the U.S. as a result of the energy crises of the 1970s and resulted 
in the enactment of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) by the U.S. Congress. 
PURPA sparked a series of changes in the U.S. electric industry that continue to this day, primarily by 
acknowledging the importance of energy conservation and energy efficiency, but also by providing 
mechanisms for new entrants to access the theretofore exclusive monopoly of electricity generation. 
Shortly following PURPA’s enactment, state regulators began requiring utilities to make investments in 
increased energy efficiency, and it is this recognition that the role of energy demand in the marketplace is 
of equal importance to that of energy supply that gave rise to the first generation of energy performance 
contracts (EPCs). The first generation of what would become the EPC as we know it today was rarely 
focused on energy conservation or energy efficiency and although they did tend to result in energy 
savings these outcomes came at a very high cost, commanding risk premiums as high as 2.5 cents per 
kilowatt-hour (Wolcott & Goldman, 1992). 
1. Regulatory Context in Early EPC Markets 
A primary constraint on early energy efficiency programs was the highly regulated structure of the 
electricity market. The first major changes to the highly regulated electricity industry in more than 40 
years occurred with enactment of PURPA, a federal law that required electric utilities to allow certain 
CICERO Report 2013:01 
 Performance-based Potential for Residential Energy Efficiency 
 
3 
 
independent electricity generators, called qualifying facilities (QFs), non-discriminatory access to the 
electric grid – for the purposes of both buying and selling power – and also required the utilities to 
purchase QF-generated power at a standard rate, called the avoided cost. However, it was not until 
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92) that competitive markets for wholesale electricity 
began to emerge, and in regions of the country where wholesale competition was adopted, ownership and 
operational responsibility of the electricity transmission infrastructure was transferred from the vertically 
integrated monopoly utilities to non-profit organizations called independent system operators (ISOs) and 
regional transmission organizations (RTOs). 
The first efforts to manage demand as a resource, called demand-side management (DSM), occurred in an 
industry structure where utilities earned profits based on their expenses. Without wholesale competition, 
the retail price of power was generally determined using the revenue requirement method under which 
state regulators set a rate of return the utility would earn on its capital equipment investment and 
operating expenses; so, to the extent that increased demand management would supplant the need for new 
capital investment higher prices were avoided, but when increased efficiency reduced the utilization of 
existing facilities the same costs were spread over a smaller quantity of electricity sales which resulted in 
higher prices in order to meet the revenue requirement. 
Naturally, utilities had no interest in actual energy conservation, and early efforts to manage demand were 
incorporated into utility efforts to minimize the cost of adding new generating capacity necessary to meet 
peak demand loads. These initial forays into the DSM bidding market were deemed problematic for three 
reasons: 1) inclusion of DSM bidding in an integrated all-source procurement solicitation; 2) high 
transaction costs for bid preparations necessary to limit the bidder’s performance risk; and, 3) vague and 
open-ended solicitations from utilities that failed to specify the utility’s resource needs and constraints 
(Wolcott & Goldman, 1992). 
 From these early experiences, it became apparent that demand-side resources could not be evaluated on 
an apples-to-apples basis with supply-side resources as DSM activities embodied a variety of non-price 
factors not applicable in generation capacity bid responses. The effectiveness of these first-generation 
bidding programs was also constrained by the comparatively high costs energy service companies 
(ESCOs) incurred for preparation of DSM bids relative to the costs of bidding by power producers 
offering much larger generation resources. A large portion of these transaction costs are attributable to 
asymmetrical information – namely, that ESCOs’ costs were driven higher as they invested substantial 
time and effort in identifying, marketing, and auditing the utilities’ customers in order to mitigate 
performance risk. 
2. Incorporating Performance Risk 
The first generation of EPCs were not “true” EPCs in the sense known today, and took a form resembling 
energy service contracts (ESCs) rather than performance-based contracts. The critical difference between 
an EPC and ESC is that the EPC confers performance risk. Development of the International Performance 
Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP) during 1996-1997 provided the first standardized 
framework for evaluating the performance of energy efficiency measures (IPMVP Committee, 2002). 
Prior to the IPMVP, ESCOs were often compensated based on the outputs (e.g., number of energy audits 
performed) instead of the outcomes (e.g., peak load reduction or kWh savings). Incorporating pay-for-
performance into DSM contracts greatly reduced the performance risk formerly borne by utilities, and 
made DSM contracts much more palatable to utilities that were concerned about making investments in 
DSM activities with no guaranteed benefits without which cost recovery would be subject to the whim of 
state regulatory bodies. 
As the benefits of EPCs became more widely appreciated and the ESCO industry developed a track 
record of success, the 2000s saw commercial lenders displace utilities and electric ratepayers as the 
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primary source of energy efficiency funding in EPCs. This new funding source coupled with new policies 
that expanded the potential market by establishing EPC standards and pre-qualified ESCOs to provide 
EPC services allowed state and federal government entities to make use of EPCs, and resulted in both 
rapid growth in the EPC market and the establishment of the EPC as a stand-alone business model that no 
longer was dependent on utility involvement. 
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III. Energy Service Companies & Performance Contracts 
A common definition1 of an energy service company is: “A company that provides energy-efficiency-
related and other value-added services and for which performance contracting is a core part of its energy-
efficiency services business.  In a performance contract, the ESCO guarantees energy and/or dollar 
savings for the project and ESCO compensation is therefore linked in some fashion to the performance of 
the project.” (Larsen, Goldman, & Satchwell, 2012).  
A. Types of ESCOs 
The U.S. ESCO industry is estimated to have more than $7 billion in revenue during 2011, up from about 
$4.1 billion in 2008 (Satchwell, Goldman, Larsen, Gilligan, & Singer, 2010). According to the most 
recent survey of ESCOs in the U.S. (Satchwell, et al. 2010) the four largest ESCOs with 49% of total 
industry revenue are building equipment manufacturers, 43% of industry revenues are attributable to 35 
companies classified as either engineering service companies – independent ESCOs – or other energy 
companies, and the remaining 8% of revenue is earned by 5 utility affiliates. Independent ESCOs have 
been the fastest growing segment of the ESCO industry, with this sector’s share of total industry revenue 
increasing from 10% of revenue in 2000 to 22% of industry revenue in 2008 (Hopper, Goldman, D., 
Singer, & Birr, 2007). 
ESCOs can also be grouped based on their market focus. ESCOs can be affiliated with other companies 
(e.g., utility affiliates or divisions of equipment manufacturers) while others are independent companies. 
The geographic focus of ESCOs is also another defining characteristic, with some companies working in 
specific geographic areas and others offering services nationwide. ESCOs also target different market 
segments, some by specializing in specific types of facilities (e.g., commercial industrial, residential, 
universities, or hospitals) and others by concentrating on particular technical areas (e.g., lighting, HVAC, 
or certain industrial processes).  
B. Types of EPCs 
An EPC is the legal agreement between a facility owner/operator and the company providing the energy 
services. The EPC agreement is typically a multi-year arrangement that specifies the scope of services to 
be provided, responsibilities of the parties, and other terms. EPCs sometimes include capital equipment 
upgrades in addition to energy services, including: energy audits, project engineering, financing, 
equipment procurement, construction, commissioning, facility staff training, measurement and 
verification of energy savings, and sometimes include ownership or operation of new equipment, 
negotiating and managing fuel and/or power purchase agreements, and other energy management 
services. 
Contracts for energy services do not always include a performance-related component, especially in the 
residential sector. About a quarter of ESCO revenues are earned from pay-for-service type contracts 
under which the ESCO is hired to provide services such as design/build (i.e., engineering, construction 
and commissioning) for a new facility, to conduct energy audits and recommend energy efficiency 
improvements, or to manage and evaluate the performance of a utility’s energy efficiency programs. In 
some cases in the U.S., where allowed by state regulations, ESCOs enter into chauffage, or utility 
purchase agreement contracts, where the ESCO owns the equipment (e.g., HVAC, lighting, etc.) and sells 
the output to the customer. 
                                                     
1 This definition is consistent with the standard definition of an ESCO in the European Commission Directive 
(2006/32/EC) on Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services, particularly in the delivery of energy services and 
assumption of some degree of performance risk by the ESCO. 
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Performance-based contracts generally take one of two forms: guaranteed savings or shared savings. As 
described by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a guide to performance contracting 
with ESCOs (Baechler & Webster, 2011), these types of EPCs are characterized by: 
- Guaranteed Savings: contracts have a fixed term and the ESCO ensures a minimum level of 
savings over a fixed term; financing is provided by the ESCO although the owner makes some 
capital investment in some cases; and, the ESCO receives no additional benefit if savings exceed 
the estimated amount. 
- Shared Savings: contracts directly tie the compensation of the ESCO to the savings earned by 
the project, the specific arrangements may take a variety of forms (e.g., ESCO receives a fixed 
percentage of savings, a minimum fee plus a percentage of savings, or a fee that scales down over 
time as the ESCO recoups its investment); financing is mostly provided by the ESCO but may 
include some capital investment by the facility owner; and some provisions usually address the 
distribution of savings in excess of projections. 
C. Measures Implemented and Savings from EPCs 
Extrapolating from a database representing an estimated 20% of ESCO projects from 1990-2008, a 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) report estimates that the ESCO industry has provided 
about $23 billion in net direct economic benefits to customers, with the average public-sector project 
providing about $0.89 per square foot in net direct benefits to customers (Larsen, Goldman, & Satchwell, 
2012). Among projects in the database are 367 state and local government projects that received a total 
net direct benefit of more than $442 million with a median benefit-cost ratio of 1.5, 186 projects at 
health/hospital facilities received a net direct benefit of more than $330 million with an median project 
benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.6, and 68 public housing projects with nearly $69 million in total net benefits at 
a median benefit-cost ratio of 1.4. 
EPC projects in the public sector have a track record of meeting or exceeding the expected level of 
savings that has improved over time. Between 1990 and 1997, nearly 80% of projects in the database met 
or exceeded expected savings levels with nearly 65% exceeding expected savings levels. Between 1998 
and 2004, about 85% of public-sector projects met or exceeded expected savings levels, but the ability of 
ESCOs to accurately predict energy savings improved with about a third meeting – without exceeding – 
projected savings. Again between 2005 and 2008 more than 80% of public-sector projects met or 
exceeded projected savings, but projections of savings by ESCOs improved dramatically so that less than 
a third of projects exceeded projected savings. This increasingly large portion of projects that meet but do 
not exceed projected savings levels is significant to the growth of EPCs because a project’s savings 
determine the ESCOs profits and, in turn, confidence in the accuracy and level of projected savings 
constrains which projects ESCOs may be willing to take on. 
1. ESCO Strategies 
ESCO retrofit strategies included in EPCs include a wide array of measures and combinations of 
measures, ranging from lighting improvements or replacement of major HVAC equipment to installation 
of on-site generation facilities, replacing major equipment (i.e., laundry or kitchen appliances), or major 
facility construction (e.g., roof replacement or re-insulation of exterior walls). Retrofit strategies for 
EPCs, as classified by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), are shown in Table 1. These 
strategies are cumulative (with the exception of “Other”), so that the major HVAC would include 
lighting-only and minor HVAC retrofits in addition to major HVAC activities. 
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Table 1 
Primary retrofit strategies utilized in ESCO projects 
Primary 
retrofit 
strategy 
Example of energy conservation measures (ECMs) included 
Lighting-only Technologies installed only include various lighting efficiency measures, controls and strategies. 
Minor HVAC Technologies installed only include less-capital intensive HVAC measures and controls (and exclude major HVAC equipment replacements) and may include lighting and other measures. 
Major HVAC 
Technologies installed include major HVAC equipment replacements (e.g., boilers, chillers, 
cooling towers, HVAC dist. improvements) and may include other HVAC control, high-efficiency 
lighting, and motors measures. 
On-site 
generation 
Technologies include installation of onsite generation equipment and may include other energy 
efficiency measures (e.g., lighting, HVAC equipment and controls, motor efficiency measures). 
Non-energya 
Technologies installed include roof or ceiling replacement, asbestos abatement (i.e., measures 
that are not installed primarily for their energy savings), and may include other efficiency 
measures (e.g., lighting or HVAC upgrades). 
Other 
Technologies installed include all other measures including domestic hot water (DHW), water 
conservation, and installation of energy-efficient equipment such as vending machines, laundry 
or office equipment, high-efficiency refrigeration, industrial process improvements and 
strategies such as staff training or utility tariff negotiation. These individual measures may also 
be included in other retrofit strategies (except lighting-only); projects categorized as "Other" 
retrofit strategy only installed these types of measures. 
a            (Hopper, Goldman, McWilliams, Birr, & McMordie-Stoughton, 2005) indicate that, in some cases, ESCO projects include 
some measures with significant costs that are not necessarily intended to produce energy savings (e.g., asbestos removal). 
Thus, we defined this retrofit strategy as “non-energy” to separate projects that may have relatively poor economic 
performance because they include some measures that provide non-energy benefits or are required for the project to move 
forward but whose value is difficult to monetize. 
Table Source: (Larsen, Goldman, & Satchwell, 2012) 
 
As each strategy incorporates a progressively more-involved level of retrofit activity, the rate of 
investment typically increases. Typical lighting-only retrofits have been historically undertaken at a real 
cost (in 2009 dollars) of less than $2 per square foot, while minor HVAC retrofits have been undertaken 
at a real cost of about $3/ft2, and major HVAC improvements at an average real cost of about $5/ft2 
although the 75th percentile of projects have required investment of about $8/ft2 (Larsen, Goldman, & 
Satchwell, 2012). 
Non-energy project strategies, in particular, have the highest rate of investment and one of the lowest 
rates of return with an average investment of between $8 and $10 per square foot for projects offering a 
payback in excess of 12 years. However, more than 85% of projects installing non-energy measures 
between 2005 and 2008 in the U.S. were K-12 schools which utilize the EPC method as a means of 
securing needed capital without taking on additional public debt in order to fund long-overdue 
infrastructure and facility repairs and upgrades. 
Project activities examined in the LBNL study were grouped into two general classifications based on the 
comprehensiveness of the EPC activities, with those implementing major HVAC, onsite generation and 
non-energy measures considered comprehensive, while those projects with lighting-only or minor HVAC 
activities were considered non-comprehensive. Overall, there were about 2.5 comprehensive projects for 
every non-comprehensive project, and the typical investment for comprehensive projects was about twice 
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that for non-comprehensive projects. The comparatively higher frequency of comprehensive projects 
suggests a preference by ESCOs, perhaps due to economies of scale, for large-scale projects with a broad 
scope of activity. 
2. ESCO Activities 
The single most common ESCO activity, as shown in Figure 1, is the installation of high-efficiency 
lighting, which is done by an estimated 93% of all projects. The second-most common source of energy 
savings is the installation of controls, both for lighting and HVAC systems, which are installed by more 
than 65% of projects in municipal, university, schools, and health facilities. Other common measures 
implemented in EPCs include upgrades to indoor climate control equipment (e.g., boilers, chillers, and 
ventilation ducts), water conservation devices, and building envelope improvements. Some customer 
classes, schools and public facilities in particular, also show a high incidence of implementing non-energy 
measures – typically including replacement of capital equipment, major building repairs (e.g., roof), or 
deferred maintenance activities. Some projects also feature on-site power generation, such as the 
installation of solar electricity generating equipment or solar water heating technology. 
Most EPC projects included multiple energy conservation measures. A 2002 study (Goldman, Osborn, 
Hopper, & Singer, 2002) from LBNL examined projects entered in the National Association of Energy 
Service Companies (NAESCO) database between 1990 and 2000, and based on 11 categories of end-use 
retrofit measures2 determined that the average institutional sector project (government, schools, 
universities, hospitals, etc.) featured activities from 2.2 measure categories. Within the institutional sector, 
the 181 state and local government projects averaged activities in 1.9 measure categories, and the 39 
projects in public housing averaged activities from 2.4 measure categories. 
 
Figure 1 – Percentage of Projects Implementing Measures (Larsen, Goldman, & Satchwell, 2012) 
                                                     
2 End-use retrofit measure categories are: lighting, comfort conditioning, motors/drives, water heaters, non-energy 
improvements, power supply, refrigeration, miscellaneous equipment and systems, industrial process improvements, 
other measures/strategies, and plumbing products and fittings. 
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D. Contracting for Energy Savings 
1. EPC Process 
The basic process for entering into an EPC includes the five phases, adapted from the PNNL guide 
(Baechler & Webster, 2011), shown in Figure 2. The first phase starts with the customer, or facility 
owner, who must define the general scope of the project – often using the results of an energy audit or 
feasibility study – and then select an ESCO or other company to carry out the work. Once financing for 
the project is secured, whether self-financed, through the ESCO, or from a third-party, the project is 
implemented and the equipment is commissioned and brought into service. During the course of the 
project, regular measurement and verification of energy savings is performed along with general 
operations and maintenance activities, until the end of the contract term when all financial and other 
obligations are fulfilled. 
There are standard contract terms and pre-approved ESCOs for the use EPCs at federal government 
facilities in the U.S., and many states have adopted a similar approach with pre-approved contract 
templates and lists of ESCOs that are pre-qualified for EPC activities in state and municipal facilities. In 
addition there are several resources3 from the energy management industry associations which also 
provide templates and resources to support facility owners’ pursuit of an EPC. 
 
Figure 2 - Energy Performance Contract Phases 
                                                     
3 These include the National Association of Energy Service Companies (NAESCO) at http://www.naesco.org; the 
Energy Services Coalition at http://www.energyservicescoalition.org/resources/model/index.html#Pre-Qualify; the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Public Housing Energy Conservation Clearinghouse at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/phecc/eperformanc
e; and the Building Owners and Managers Association’s International Energy Performance Contracting Model at 
http://www.boma.org/resources/bepc/Pages/default.aspx  
Project Close-Out 
Close-Out Project, Resolve Financial Obligations 
Performance Period 
Operations & Maintenance, Verification and Quantification of Accrued Savings 
Acceptance 
Commissioning and Verification Measurement Procedures, Staff Training 
Implementation 
Equipment Installation, Efficiency Measures Equipment Purchasing, Construction 
Project Development 
Feasibility Study and Scope, Finalize Contract Evaluate and Select ESCO, Secure Financing 
CICERO Report 2013:01 
 Performance-based Potential for Residential Energy Efficiency 
 
10 
 
 
2. EPC Terms & Approaches 
While most EPC projects are completed in a single phase, about 13% of projects studied from the 
NAESCO database were implemented in multiple phases. A high percentage (41%) of multi-phase 
projects reported multiple phases of lighting-only retrofits – only 24% of all projects reported lighting-
only retrofits. Overall, multi-phase projects tended to be more comprehensive (i.e., utilize more activity 
measures or strategies) than their single-phase counterparts. Some reasons cited for the use of a phased 
approach include: minimize construction-related disruption, constraints on contracting and procurement, 
and a desire to assess ESCO performance on an individual project prior to making larger/longer 
commitment (Goldman, Hopper, & Osborn, 2005). 
The length of EPC contract terms also varies, in some cases based on the types of retrofit measures 
selected and in others due to restrictions imposed by third-party funding programs (e.g., ratepayer funded 
efficiency programs, state contract rules, etc.). The NAESCO database – less ratepayer or other publicly 
funded projects – indicates that slightly more than 20% of projects completed between 1996 and 2000 had 
contract terms of less than five years, about half of projects during the same time period had contract 
lengths of between 10 and 14 years, and that about 10% of EPCs had contract terms of 15 years or longer 
(Goldman, Osborn, Hopper, & Singer, 2002). 
3. Performance Requirements, Guarantees, and Insurance 
Much like the ESCO offering the EPC assumes some or all of the performance risk associated with the 
guaranteed level of savings and may be exposed to the credit risk of the EPC counterparty, the facility 
owner or operator who will receive EPC services from the ESCO also incurs a performance risk – the risk 
that the new equipment or repairs installed by the ESCO may not be as durable, functional, or reliable as 
what is being replaced. After all, the energy savings from a new high-efficiency device are of little-to-no 
benefit if the device is unreliable and in frequent need of repair. EPC contracts with federal housing 
agencies in the U.S. address this risk by incorporating performance specifications into the EPC. 
EPC’s with federal agencies (or public housing agencies using federal funds from Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD)) have a maximum statutory contract length of 25 years4, and energy savings 
performance contracts (ESPCs) require annual energy audits and terms specifying government payments 
and performance guarantees – effectively placing the burden of ensuring the efficacy of equipment 
operation on the contractor for a specified length of time.  
Federal law5 requires that, “Any such performance guarantee shall provide that the contractor is 
responsible for maintenance and repair services for any energy related equipment, including computer 
software systems.” So, EPC contracts with the federal government in the U.S. require guarantees of not 
only energy savings but also of equipment operation; state agencies likely have similar clauses, the 
specifics of which vary from state to state, and private organizations are generally left to fend for 
themselves in negotiating contract clauses. 
The generic indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract for ESPCs from the Federal Energy 
Management Program6 includes standards of service specifications as part of the performance 
requirements for energy conservation measures (ECMs) in each ECM’s task order (TO). These standards 
of service could include specifications such as acceptable temperature, lighting level, noise criteria, or 
other factors (e.g., even a minimum amount of operational time required) (IDIQ Contract, C.3). The IDIQ 
                                                     
4 42 USC §8287 (a)(1) 
5 42 USC §8287 (a)(2)(A) 
6 IDIQ contract template available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/espcs_resources.html  
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contract also requires post-installation reports and annual measurement and verification reports (IDIQ 
Contract, C.4.6) that include not only energy savings but standards of service evaluations as well. 
Operational requirements are also specified in the IDIQ Contract (C.6), which states “Regardless of who 
performs the operations, the contractor shall be responsible for the operations of all installed ECMs” 
(C.6.1). Contractors are also responsible for all preventive maintenance, including even maintenance 
activities performed by the government agency (IDIQ Contract, C.7), and responsibility for repair of all 
energy conservation measures also falls on the contractor (IDIQ Contract, C.8): 
IDIQ Contract, C.8.2   Repair of ECMs includes all material and equipment 
associated with the replacement or repair of facilities, systems, or equipment that 
have failed or are in a condition of diminished ECM performance as determined 
by the contractor, and concurred to by the agency. 
IDIQ Contract, C.8.3   Equipment Failure - If equipment failure or damage is a 
result of the contractor’s failure to perform or negligence in performing repairs, 
the contractor shall provide repair or replacement at its expense or, if repaired or 
replaced at agency expense, the contractor shall reimburse the agency for losses 
attributable to the contractor’s failure or negligence. 
Generally, title to the ECM-related equipment vests with the government after the government’s 
acceptance, but acknowledgement is given to the possibility of equipment title vesting with the contractor 
or a third party (i.e., financier) (IDIQ Contract, H.2). Specific responsibilities of the parties are designated 
in the Risk, Responsibility and Performance Matrix7 with subparts for a) equipment performance, b) 
operations, c) preventive maintenance, and d) equipment repair and replacement. 
Aside from the above provisions, there are additional alternatives, both established and emerging. The 
first obvious alternative is requiring [or considering] equipment warranties in any EPC solicitation. There 
are also a variety of insurance products increasingly being used in the renewable energy industry in the 
U.S. that would be applicable to mitigate the risk of nonperformance (Janison & Schlosberg, 2011), 
including: 
- Boiler and machinery insurance, or equipment breakdown insurance (a specialized but common 
supplement to property insurance); 
- Equipment warranty insurance, for some level of performance over a period of time; 
- Warranty surety assurance that warranty will be honored even if company offering warranty is 
insolvent; 
- System performance/installation warranty insurance mitigated performance risk, typically by 
backing the performance guarantee of the contractor; and, 
- System performance insurance which is more idea or concept than available insurance policy at 
the moment, but would insure the total system’s performance and not just individual components. 
                                                     
7 See IDIQ Contract, Attachment J-7, Section 3. Performance 
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IV. Development, Design, and Operation of EPCs 
A. Lessons Learned from the Growth of EPCs 
The history of the ESCO industry provides some clues as to what factors drive success in the energy 
services business and performance contracting in particular. As summarized by a report (ICF 
International, NAESCO, 2007) prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ESCOs 
originated in response to state regulations mandating that utilities increase energy efficiency efforts 
following the energy crises of the 1970s, and while ESCO activity during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
is often described as the first generation of EPCs, projects during this period rarely involved the ESCO 
assuming any performance risk and were typically executed on a fee-for-services basis. 
The period from the late 1980s through the early 1990s saw the first true performance contracts emerge as 
utilities were required to incorporate procurement of energy efficiency as a resource in a planning process 
called integrated resource planning (IRP). With the U.S. electricity market still composed of regulated 
monopolies operating without wholesale or retail competition, this period was dominated by a focus on 
reducing peak load in an attempt to avoid construction of new generation facilities that would otherwise 
be needed to serve rising peak demand load. Inclusion of energy efficiency as a resource on par with 
generation resources brought the need for reliable standardized protocols or measurement and verification 
(M&V) of energy efficiency. 
Following the development of reliable M&V protocols with the introduction of the IPMVP and a track 
record of success with early projects, the EPC business entered a period of rapid growth. Industry growth 
during the mid-to-late 1990s was driven by several factors: 1) increased access to finance provided by 
commercial lenders, 2) reduced ESCO transaction cost and risk, allowing customers to realize a greater 
portion of a project’s energy savings without lowering ESCO return, 3) the incorporation of non-energy 
benefits (e.g., use of capital leases, deferred maintenance, water savings, etc.) into the EPC model, and 4) 
the adoption of standard EPC programs by local, state and federal government. 
Following a brief lull in the EPC market after the efforts to restructure U.S. electricity markets faltered in 
the wake of the collapse of Enron8 in the early 2000s, increased energy market volatility, rising energy 
prices, major energy infrastructure disruptions9, and a renewed focus on energy efficiency brought about 
new market opportunities for the ESCO industry in the mid-to-late 2000s. This recent period of industry 
growth saw the introduction of new technologies, particularly on-site generation and renewable energy, 
provide an additional source of value in the product and service offering of ESCOs. 
These periods of change in the history of the ESCO industry provide some insight into the factors driving 
the success of EPCs in the U.S. market, and provide a framework for examining the potential for future 
increases in EPC activity within the municipal and residential market segments. The remainder of this 
section discusses specific barriers to the EPC business model and how their mitigation has contributed to 
the growth of the ESCO industry in the U.S. 
1. Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs constrain the size of the potential EPC market as high transaction costs increase the 
minimum, or break-even, quantity of energy savings necessary for a project to be successful. The first 
                                                     
8 Enron Corp. was a leading innovator in wholesale electricity trading and a primary driver of electricity-market 
restructuring across the U.S. until the company’s collapse amid scandal in late 2001.  
9 The disruptions include repeated summertime rolling blackouts in California, shutdown of pipelines delivering 
natural gas and petroleum products from the Gulf of Mexico to the Eastern Seaboard in the wake of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, and large-scale blackouts in the Northeastern U.S. 
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generation of demand-side bidding provided results that were generally considered suboptimal, largely 
due to unnecessarily high transaction costs (Wolcott & Goldman, 1992). These high transaction costs are 
largely attributable to the manner in which utilities sought to procure energy efficiency resources. ESCOs, 
in preparing responses to requests for proposals (RFPs), were provided little, if any, information about: 1) 
the energy consumption or peak load of utility customers, 2) the amount or type (i.e., reduced peak load, 
reduced consumption, etc.) of energy efficiency resources being sought, or 3) the nature of the services or 
type of compensation the utility was willing – or able – to provide. 
These early inefficiencies in the process to procure energy efficiency resources were remedied to some 
extent by RFPs for energy efficiency that were issued separately from those for generation resources, 
RFPs seeking resource quantities of a specific type, and RFPs targeting specific market segments (i.e., 
industrial, commercial, residential). These process improvements allowed ESCOs to reduce the time and 
effort necessary to prepare a response to bid solicitations, and allowed the development of proposals that 
were more consistent with the utility’s needs. 
2. Information 
Information is fundamental to the EPC model – information about both the potential energy savings and 
the actual energy savings that result from project activities. Information about energy savings potential 
requires not only knowledge of how much energy is used by the customer’s equipment and devices, but 
also the operating cycle (i.e., frequency, duration) of the energy-using equipment. While government, 
commercial, and industrial facilities are typically operated on a reliable consistent cycle with many 
similarities from one customer to another, residential customers in comparison are much more varied in 
how they use energy. 
Potential energy savings are also determined based on the extent to which upgrades or retrofits can 
reliably alter energy consumption. The importance of reliable energy efficiency improvements is 
demonstrated by the ESCO industry’s emphasis on lighting upgrades and HVAC improvements. Both of 
these areas feature regular energy use on a consistent schedule by non-residential customers, both are 
often installed when a building is constructed and without a targeted intervention are likely to be repaired 
rather than replaced and therefore the outdated less-efficient legacy models are likely to remain in service. 
Additionally, equipment of this type can often be upgraded with limited disruption to other aspects of the 
facility, at a known cost, and without the risk of unexpected costs or delays as may occur in more invasive 
upgrades such as improving a building envelope. 
In order to properly evaluate the energy savings from an EPC project, the energy savings must be 
measured and verified. Depending on the nature of energy use and the activity level in a facility, M&V of 
energy savings is not always possible from a basic measure of the facility’s total energy consumption. 
Energy consumption may rise following EPC improvements, yet energy savings may be substantial – 
some potential causes of this circumstance include: increased activity levels, changes in weather (i.e., 
cooler summer or warmer winter than normal), new devices or equipment are installed, or EPC changes 
may result in the facility’s occupants changing behaviors (e.g., a new HVAC system and controls may 
result in occupants using fans for summer cooling or inefficient personal space heaters in winter). 
3. Financing 
Access to financing for EPC improvements greatly expanded the ESCO industry. The entry of 
commercial lenders brought increasingly sophisticated financing arrangements and increased the appeal 
of and feasibility for customers considering entering into an EPC. The financing barrier is closely tied to 
the allocation of both performance and credit risk. The expertise of ESCOs in producing energy savings 
and the assumption of project performance risk by ESCOs provides lenders with greater assurance of a 
project’s financial viability. Furthermore, modern EPC models are structured so that the ESCO finances 
the project at the customer’s facility, and commercial lenders provide financing to the ESCO – thereby 
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attaching the credit risk of the commercial lender to the ESCO, and allowing the ESCO to divide its risk 
among a portfolio of several projects. 
An examination (Goldman, Osborn, Hopper, & Singer, 2002) of “turnkey” project costs – not including 
financing costs – for 1,426 projects reporting cost information to the NAESCO database between 1982 
and 2000 indicated median and average project costs of $700,000 and $1,800,000, respectively. About 
280 projects (20%) had a cost of less than $200,000, about 35% of projects had a cost of less than 
$400,000, and only 10 to 15 projects had a cost in excess of $20 million. The “turnkey” project costs 
described above represent “The cost to develop and construct the project including all development, 
engineering, installation, and construction financing costs as of the date of acceptance by customer,” and 
exclude both financing costs and ongoing service costs such as those for monitoring and maintenance. 
Based on this set of projects in the NAESCO database, Goldman, et al. (2002) estimate future financing 
costs increase the “turnkey” project costs by about 21%. 
Greater access to financing has allowed the ESCO industry to expand, but has also added another 
dimension to the required scale economies for EPCs – larger amounts of capital require both larger-scale 
projects and a larger number of projects to be undertaken without significant increases in the transaction 
cost of each project. The 39 public housing EPC projects reported in the NAESCO database had a median 
cost of about $1.9 million, with the lowest quartile of projects costing about $1 million and the highest 
quartile about $6 million. Of all sectors in the database, public housing had the highest median and 25th 
percentile cost as well as the highest interquartile spread by far; although when normalized by floor area, 
the median and 25th percentile of public housing sector costs were about $1.75/ft2 and were well within 
the range of other sector costs (Goldman, Osborn, Hopper, & Singer, 2002). 
4. Streamlined Process 
The development and growth of EPCs was also facilitated by state and federal government efforts to 
streamline the EPC process. On one side, utilities and other parties seeking to employ EPCs as a source of 
energy efficiency made clear in their solicitations for competitive proposals their goals for energy 
savings, their targeted market segments, and provided indications about what they were willing to pay for 
energy (kWh) and load (kW) reductions. Another approach used by utilities and governments alike was to 
pre-qualify ESCOs, so that any pre-qualified ESCO could provide services to a facility owner following 
certain guidelines. A final approach to streamlining the process was the use of template-based EPC 
agreements with standard terms and conditions. 
B. Evolution of Energy Efficiency Efforts 
1. Regulatory Impetus 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 197810 (PURPA) was the first federal legislation enacted to 
provide for the increased conservation of electric energy and increased energy efficiency11 as a means to 
provide equitable rates to consumers. PURPA provided for the market entry of new generators by 
ensuring access to transmission infrastructure and requiring that these new generators, called qualifying 
facilities (QFs), be compensated for providing energy or capacity to the utility at a rate called the avoided 
cost12. 
                                                     
10 16 U.S.C. Chapter 46 
11 16 U.S.C. §2601 
12 Avoided cost means the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for 
the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from 
another source. See 18 CFR §292.101(b)(6) 
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Through the 1980s vertically integrated electric utility monopolies entered into long-term avoided cost 
contracts with independent power producers requiring the utility to pay these QFs their incremental cost, 
which in many cases was set based on the cost of the large-scale nuclear generating facilities that had 
been constructed during the preceding decade and were just beginning to enter service. As the real price 
of natural gas fell precipitously during the 1980s and 1990s, independent power producers saw significant 
profit margins as the spread between their generation cost and the avoided cost rate grew larger 
(Borenstein & Bushnell, 2000). The result of these high-cost contracts in many cases was high electric 
rates due to stranded costs that were recovered by utilities at the expense of their customers. 
While utilities and their customers were locked in to paying high electricity prices for excess baseload 
capacity, they still faced the need to add capacity to meet peak demand which further increased electricity 
generating costs and, in turn, retail prices. In response to rising electricity prices, many states began to 
require more comprehensive planning methods that included consideration of energy efficiency and peak 
load-reduction measures in determining the future resource mix. The result was the emergence of the first 
substantial activity in the energy efficiency market area by U.S. electric utilities. 
2. Competitive DSM Bidding 
This push into the energy efficiency arena by electric utilities drove considerable interest in demand-side 
management activities, particularly those that reduced peak load. Many utilities established their own 
DSM programs in an attempt to avoid making additional investments in new generation capacity, and 
typically offered customers discounted rates or some other form of compensation in exchange for 
allowing the utility to turn off equipment with high electric capacity requirements during peak hours; the 
corresponding program in the residential sector typically focused on remote utility control over air 
conditioners and electric water heaters during normal workday hours. 
These programs did little to actually conserve energy, but rather created energy savings by allowing the 
utility to avoid increasing electric rates to pay for the cost of new peak generation capacity. Often peak 
load-focused DSM programs merely shifted consumption from peak hours to off-peak hours. Incentives 
in these early programs were typically paid to the participating electric consumers, but by reducing utility 
investment and lowering demand for the highest-cost electricity generation, all ratepayers benefitted from 
electric rates that were either reduced or lower than they otherwise would have been. 
By the mid-1980s the utility practice of demand-side management (DSM) had become widespread, 
signifying a fundamental shift in industry planning and operation as the concept of a utility influencing 
and managing its customers’ demand as a supply resource similar to the way supply from generation 
facilities is managed began to take hold. By 1993, DSM programs were well established and utility 
spending reached $1.8 billion (York, Witte, Nowak, & Kushler, 2012). However, despite an increased 
focus on managing demand, the high avoided cost rates and past investment decisions by utilities in some 
states continued to yield comparatively high retail electricity prices, and as a result these states sought to 
form broader regional markets for wholesale electricity which would allow for more efficient use of 
existing generation capacity. 
3. Consumer Awareness 
Concurrent with development of utility programs to stimulate energy efficiency were other efforts such as 
the ENERGY STAR program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of 
Energy. The ENERGY STAR is a product certification label first introduced in 1992 to assist consumers 
with identifying energy efficient personal computers that has expanded to include more than 60 product 
categories which had over 15,000 certified products and another 10,000 products registered for 
certification in 2011 (U.S. EPA, 2011). The ENERGY STAR label, which assures consumers that a 
product is up to 65% more energy efficient than the standard model, reached a milestone in 2011 with 
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more than 80% of the American public recognizing the label, 75% of whom credit the label as an 
important factor in their purchase decision (U.S. EPA, 2012). 
The ENERGY STAR Homes label was first adopted in 1995, and since then more than 1.3 million homes 
have received the ENERGY STAR label across the U.S. Energy efficiency and other green building 
practices have also become widespread, such as the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design (LEED) standard for homes and buildings. The LEED program provides 
training and certification in cost-efficient and energy-saving building techniques for its 162,000 
professional members and 14,000 member companies.  
4. Competition into the Marketplace 
The introduction of competition into some electricity markets in the U.S. heralded a shift in focus for 
utilities away from managing demand and back towards a supply-dominated mindset as the opportunity to 
procure lower-cost generation resources in competitive wholesale markets was made available in many 
regions of the country. The result of this reoriented focus was a decline in utility spending on energy 
efficiency programs, and in response many states established new policies and sources of funding for 
energy efficiency. The two primary mechanisms that have since been increasingly adopted to fund utility 
energy efficiency efforts are the public benefits fund (PBF) and the energy efficiency resource standard 
(EERS), and, in a group of northeastern states, funds generated through the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) have become a source of energy efficiency funding. 
Public benefits funds (PBFs) are state-level programs generally adopted to provide support for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency following electricity market restructuring (i.e., wholesale competition). 
PBFs are often capitalized by fees charged to electric ratepayers, which may either be a flat fee or a 
charge based on electricity consumption. The consumption-based charge is typically assessed in 
increments of mills per kWh, or in units of 1/10th of one cent per kWh, and range from a high of 4.82 
mills in California to a low of 0.03 mills in North Carolina (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). The 18 
states with PBFs in mid-2012 all have unique PBF programs, some like Delaware have established a 
Sustainable Energy Utility to manage the fund and determine the share of investment in renewable energy 
versus energy efficiency, while others like Hawaii have state legislation specifying central fund 
administration and uses the fund to only provide incentives for energy efficiency and solar water heating. 
Michigan uses the majority of the $89 million annual PBF receipts to support the state’s low-income 
energy efficiency fund (DSIRE, 2012). 
Another source of funding for energy efficiency in 10 northeast states is the U.S.’s only multi-state 
mandatory greenhouse gas emission reductions program, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI). Under the RGGI program, electric utility emissions are capped and required to decline slightly 
year by year. Compliance is demonstrated by a utility through the submission of allowances equal to its 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the year. Quarterly auctions are held through which utilities 
purchase allowances, and auction proceeds are provided to the individual states to use as they see fit. 
Through the RGGI’s first phase (ended Dec. 31, 2010), nearly $790 million was generated from auction 
proceeds, and 51.6% of that amount was invested in energy efficiency programs. Excluding program 
administrative costs, four states – Vermont, Rhode Island, New Hampshire13, and Maine14 – used auction 
proceeds exclusively for energy efficiency. Energy efficiency activities supported by RGGI auction funds 
include: home weatherization and retrofitting, incentives for energy-efficient appliances, educational 
programs, and energy-sector occupational training programs (RGGI, 2011). 
                                                     
13 11% of auction proceeds received by New Hampshire went to reducing the state budget deficit and resolving a 
fiscal crisis in 2010, while the remainder less program administration costs was invested in energy efficiency. 
14 1% of auction proceeds received by Maine were allocated to the “Other GHG Reduction Programs” category. 
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An Energy efficiency resource standard (EERS) is a state-level policy requiring a minimum level of 
increased energy efficiency. As of July 2012, EERS had been implemented by 20 states and another 7 
states had a voluntary goal, 12 of which included both natural gas and electricity while the remainder 
included only electricity (DSIRE, 2012). EERS are a relatively new phenomenon in the U.S. with about 
two-thirds of state policies having been enacted in the past five years and many programs still 
approaching their first benchmark savings year. The EERS take a variety of forms; Vermont and New 
York requiring consumption to be reduced by a cumulative percent below a baseline by a target year, 
Hawaii has established a long-term goal to achieve reductions of 4,300 GWh by 2030, Texas requires 
savings equivalent to 20% of incremental load growth in 2011 and increases the share of incremental load 
growth that must be avoided to 25% in 2012 and 30% in 2013 and thereafter, but the majority of EERS in 
place require a small amount of annual savings – about 1% to 1.5% – at the outset and increase the annual 
savings target in future years (Sciortino, Nowak, Witte, York, & Kushler, 2011). 
C. Interaction between Energy Efficiency Barriers & EPCs 
A large gap exists between the potential cost savings and economic benefits of energy efficiency and the 
actual implementation of energy efficiency measures (Granade, Creyts, Derkach, Farese, Nyquist, & 
Ostrowski, 2009). According to data from a survey conducted by the Consortium for Energy Efficiency 
and Institute for Energy Efficiency, total ratepayer-funded electric efficiency budgets15 reached more than 
$6.8 billion in 2011 – 84% of which was attributable to utilities (Cooper & Wood, 2012). According to 
this same study, energy efficiency expenditures in 2010 saved more than 112 TWh16 nationwide at an 
average cost of 4.3 cents per kWh, or about 66% less than the 2010 U.S. average electricity price of 9.83 
cents per kWh (EIA, 2011). The residential sector – including low-income energy efficiency programs – 
represented about 31% of these savings. 
Data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011) show a similar share of savings from 
energy efficiency in the residential sector, with total 2010 energy efficiency savings from utility programs 
of more than 32 million MWh, representing about 37% of energy savings from utility programs. The 
direct cost – not including customer incentives or utility administration – of these savings was $573 
million, or 1.785 cents per kWh saved. The term “energy-efficiency gap” (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994) is 
demonstrated by the vast difference between the costs of energy efficiency measures and the cost of 
electricity. Described as a market failure, this gap between the direct cost of electricity and the cost of 
saving electricity understates the efficiency gap since this direct cost-benefit comparison is not inclusive 
of the many indirect social and environmental costs (e.g., climate change, resource consumption, air and 
water pollution, health effects, etc.) associated with the most common electricity generation technologies 
(Golove & Eto, 1996). 
1. Barriers to Energy Efficiency 
The first systematic presentation of the causes of this gap between opportunity and exploitation were 
presented in a 1980 paper (Blumstein, Krieg, Schipper, & York, 1980) that categorized the social and 
institutional barriers to economically rational decisions of consumers. Blumstein, et al. (1980) identified 
six classes of barriers: 1) misplaced incentives, 2) lack of information or misinformation, 3) regulation, 4) 
market structure, 5) financing, and 6) custom. As these barriers relate specifically to the residential 
market, an additional barrier called the inseparability of features, or gold plating has been identified 
                                                     
15 Budgets include not only expenditures on energy efficiency and demand response, but also spending on 
evaluation, measurement and verification activities. 
16 TWh = TeraWatt hour = 1,000 GigaWatt hours (GWh) = 1,000,000 MegaWatt hours (MWh) = 1,000,000,000 
Kilowatt hours (kWh) 
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(Ruderman, Levine, & McMahon, 1987), and for residential markets I propose a new class of obstacle 
called consumer heterogeneity. 
2. Addressing Barriers with EPCs 
EPCs address many of these obstacles to increase energy efficiency. Early EPCs aligned some misplaced 
incentives by focusing on efforts to reduce in peak demand load in utility customers’ facilities, thereby 
supporting lower electricity rates for all utility customers while providing additional savings for 
participating customers. The ESCOs that generally enter into EPCs are, by definition, specialists in 
energy efficiency and as previously discussed have a strong track record of applying their technical 
knowledge via EPCs where the ESCO assumes performance risk, a structure that reduces mis- or lack-of-
information as a market barrier. To some extent, the market structure barrier and inseparability of 
features/gold plating barriers have been reduced, largely because many manufacturers of energy 
efficiency equipment have expanded their business and now include their own ESCO division. The 
adoption of mandates for energy efficiency and capitalization of funds have reduced regulatory barriers, 
as have standardization of EPC contracts and ESCO pre-qualification for state and local government 
facilities. 
3. Key Obstacles Remaining for Small-Scale Projects 
Financing is one key remaining barrier to developing EPCs for smaller-scale residential and municipal 
EPCs. Funding sources such as those previously identified along with commercial lenders and other 
sources of capital have the potential to support EPCs in these market segments, but economies of scale 
still prohibit most EPC-like structures from being implemented since individual projects are simply too 
small in terms of their potential energy savings to justify the overhead and transaction costs. For 
residential projects in particular, the transaction cost is very high as a portion of potential project savings. 
Even estimating the actual ratio of transaction cost to potential savings is remarkably difficult due to the 
obstacle proposed in this paper – consumer heterogeneity. 
Commercial, industrial, education, and municipal buildings tend to operate on set schedules with 
reasonably consistent consumption patterns that are somewhat transferable from one facility to another. 
These characteristics simplify modeling and estimating potential energy savings for facilities within these 
segments even if potential savings at an individual facility are of insufficient size to be of interest to an 
ESCO under an EPC model. Residences however, may contain a wide variety of energy-consuming 
appliances and devices, numerous types of lighting fixtures, have unknown building characteristics that 
may negatively impact the effectiveness of energy efficiency upgrades (e.g., leaky windows, moisture 
problems, improperly installed building envelopes, improperly installed equipment, etc.), consume energy 
based on the behavior of occupants, and – most importantly – energy consumption patterns may vary 
widely from one household to another and among individual members of the same household. 
To even begin developing strategic approaches to implementing energy efficiency, energy conservation, 
or energy savings measures at the residential level on any meaningful scale, the limitless potential 
variations in household consumption – regardless of whether attributable to differences in household 
equipment, or the number and behavior of consumers in the household – require that information about 
individual consumption be accessible and quantifiable. Advanced metering and controls are foundational 
requirements for residential-sector energy efficiency on a large scale. 
As of mid-2011, between 13.4% and 18.4% of electric meters in the U.S. were considered advanced 
meters – meaning that they can communicate in at least one direction (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2011). These so-called “smart meters” are essential to improving the transparency of 
residential sector energy consumption habits as they allow consumers [or ESCO, utilities, etc.] to identify 
how much energy is consumed at what times, for what purpose [or by what device], and, in some cases, 
allow automated consumer responses to price and other market signals. 
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V. Prospects for the Future of Performance-based Energy Savings 
Contracts in Housing 
The residential sector comprises only a small portion of ESCO revenue, with utility residential programs 
and public housing representing a combined 5% of ESCO revenue in 2006 and increasing to represent a 
combined share of 9% of ESCO revenue in 2008 at 6% and 3%, respectively (Satchwell, Goldman, 
Larsen, Gilligan, & Singer, 2010). Residential-sector revenue earned by ESCOs is mostly from ESCOs 
providing energy services to utility energy efficiency programs rather than performance contracting. 
A. Energy Savings in Housing: Barriers & Opportunities 
More than three decades into U.S. efforts to increase energy efficiency, it is clear that there is no simple, 
easy solution, especially in the housing market. EPCs have proven to be an effective mechanism for 
driving energy efficiency in some market segments – mostly large-scale institutional users, but of limited 
effectiveness in reaching small-scale energy users on a disaggregated basis. To address this challenge, not 
only is a basic understanding of energy efficiency and its barriers required, but this understanding must 
also be overlaid onto the specific circumstances found in the housing sector. 
Towards a more thorough understanding of the barriers to energy savings and the viability of EPCs in the 
residential housing sector, this section will examine the facets of these barriers from two perspectives – 
that of the ESCO and that of the residential consumer. A number of barriers to energy efficiency have 
been previously identified, and as evidenced by the burgeoning growth of the EPC market have been 
either overcome or worked around in many consuming sectors. The fact that housing – both residential 
and public housing – remains such a small portion of the EPC marketplace is indicative of this sector’s 
unique attributes. 
As an initial foray into better understanding the uniqueness of the housing sector, we first examine the 
ways in which EPCs have worked and identify characteristics of housing that constrain the effectiveness 
of EPCs. Following that comparison is an examination of experiments showing successful approaches to 
increasing energy efficiency in the housing sector. 
1. Successful EPCs & U.S. Housing Stock 
a) EPC Investment Trends 
There are some basic fundamental requirements to make EPCs feasible, starting with a large volume of 
energy consumption and correspondingly large energy expenditures. Typical public and private sector 
energy intensity reported by Larsen et al. (2012) was about 100,000 Btu per square foot per year prior to 
the retrofit, with retrofits resulting in reductions of about 25% and 35% in the public and private sectors, 
respectively. EPCs have typically been implemented starting with simple, low-risk investments (e.g., 
lighting and controls) and incrementally increasing to more investment-intensive and involved efficiency 
improvements (e.g., minor and major HVAC retrofits), and finally expand to include new power 
generation sources and other non-energy infrastructure activities. 
Larsen, et al. (2012) reports investment rates per square foot of about $2 for lighting-only, $3 for minor 
HVAC, and $4 for major HVAC retrofits. On-site generation investment rates vary widely among the 
breakout sectors with the private sector yielding the lowest rate, quite possibly due to numerous tax 
incentives available to private entities for on-site generation investments in the U.S., but the public 
investment rate in on-site generation showed a normalized value of about $6/ft2 while non-energy retrofits 
were typically in the range of $8 to $10 per square foot. 
Typical savings reported by Larsen et al. (2012) were between $0.50 and $0.60 per square foot in the 
public and private sectors, respectively – about 20% of which were attributable to non-energy savings in 
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both sectors. On average, across all sectors, the number of measures installed as part of an EPC has 
increased over the past two decades, while “comprehensive” retrofits have become more common, and 
between 1990 and 2008 the median project investment rate in the public sector has more than doubled 
from about $3/ft2 to more than $6/ft2 and increased by 50% in the private sector to about $3/ft2.  
In the private sector, a large majority (61%) of EPC projects have targeted a specific piece of equipment, 
while in the public and institutional sector only 1/3 of projects have targeted a specific piece of equipment 
for quantifying savings, 54% have savings based on the total utility bill, and the remaining projects have 
focused on savings attributable to a specific end-use. 
b) U.S. Residential Energy & Housing Characteristics 
According to the Energy information Administration’s 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, the 
average U.S. home consumes 940 kWh per month at a price of 11.72 cents per kWh, and spends $110.14 
per month on energy. U.S. homes average 1,971 square feet and spend an average of $2,024 per year on 
all energy sources combined. Average annual energy expenditures per square foot in 2009 were just under 
$1.03. 
Average energy expenditures per square foot in detached single family homes were $0.948 in 2009, 
$1.46/ft2 in apartment buildings with 2-4 units, and $1.347/ft2 in apartments with 5 or more units. Homes 
built in 1990 or later have an average size of 2,329 ft2 and spend an average of $2,139/year on energy - 
$0.918/ft2 on energy. Even the most energy-inefficient houses – the 57% of U.S. houses built prior to 
1980 – have annual average energy expenditures of only $1.085/ft2. 
c) Barrier of Scale & Opportunity 
There is perhaps no more clear a demonstration of why the residential sector accounts for such a small 
share of the EPC market in the U.S. – the scale of energy intensity in U.S. housing is simply insufficient 
to support even minimal EPC investment based on typical investment rates per square foot for the EPC 
industry.  
Consider the typical EPC investment rate of about $2/ft2 for the most entry-level lighting-only retrofits. 
Lighting represents an estimated 6% of residential energy demand (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011), or 
about $0.06/ft2 worth of annual energy expense in 2009. Even if the lighting retrofit eliminated all 
lighting energy consumption it would take more than 30 years before the retrofit achieved a simple 
payback – many times longer than any lights could reasonably be expected to last. The approach to 
residential energy efficiency has been modeled after the successes in other sectors, but with much less 
success.  
Electric utility-operated energy efficiency, or demand-side management, programs have found compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFLs) to be a major source of savings, with recent reports from the U.S. Department 
of Energy (Swope, 2010) indicating that 84% of total DSM savings in programs of the New York State 
Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) are attributable to CFL programs, and similar 
results have been experienced by programs in Wisconsin and in the territory of California’s Pacific Gas & 
Electric (PG&E) with CFLs representing 64% and 62% of total DSM program savings, respectively. 
The numerous benefits of using CFLs have been well documented and a number of reasons for the 
remarkably low adoption rates have been postulated (Haddad, 1994). Yet, even in utility efficiency 
programs focused on CFLs, the market penetration level seems stuck well below the projected maximum 
socket saturation level projected by Swope (2010) of around 80%. A study of the Xcel Energy Home 
Energy Lighting Program performed at the end of 2009 indicated CFLs had been installed in an estimated 
16% of sockets in the utilities’ territory with survey respondents indicating a median of 6.7 CFLs installed 
per household, and 65% of respondents indicating they had at least one CFL installed (Dimetrosky, 
Winch, Albee, Parkinson, Oman, & Wilson-Wright, 2010). Customers are apparently satisfied with CFLs, 
with the results of a recent survey of CFL users indicating that 86% of those surveyed were either 
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“somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the standard CFLs they currently used (Nexus Market 
Research, 2009); yet, in the same year the lighting market share of CFLs was only 16%, down from a 
peak of 22% in 2007 (Bickel, Swope, & Lauf, 2010). Ultimately, seeing few other options, the U.S. 
Congress finally enacted legislation17 in 2007 that amounts to little more than a technological mandate to 
prohibit the sale of incandescent lamps. 
2. The Role of Information in Residential Energy Efficiency 
Simply put, residential EPCs have not worked because the residential energy market is different than 
other market segments – different in the way energy is used, the rationale through which efficiency is 
evaluated, the per-unit scale of energy use, and in the capacity for energy consumers to modify their 
energy use. Although energy consumption in the residential segment differs in many respects from 
consumption in other sectors, housing is not without opportunity to realize energy savings. 
Research at LBNL has estimated that U.S. residences could reduce their standby energy load by as much 
as 10% without changing regular activities simply by eliminating the phantom, or standby, electric load18 
attributable to devices that are not being used. Another recent study (Allcott, 2011a) has identified 
potential savings in the residential sector attributable to individuals’ desire to conform to social norms. 
This study examined the impact of informing people about how their energy consumption compares to 
that of their peers in similar circumstances, and determined that the highest energy users responded to 
information about their relative consumption with reductions in excess of 6%, and the program reduced 
consumption on average by about 2%. 
Allcott’s (2011) study and a related effort (Jessoe & Rapson, 2012) provide strong indications that 
residential energy consumers have a substantial capacity to reduce energy consumption but lack the 
necessary information – both consumption quantity and price data – to stimulate a conservation response. 
In an experiment conducted using randomized controlled trials, Jessoe and Rapson (2012) demonstrated 
that electricity consumers who were given short-term advance notice of electricity price increases 
responded by reducing demand by as much as 7% compared to a control group, but, more importantly, 
another group of consumers in the same experiment reduced their consumption by between 8% and 22% 
when given both advance notice of price increases and information about their electricity consumption 
quantity via in-home displays19. 
The in-home displays enabled consumers to receive feedback on electricity consumption-related 
behaviors, which was estimated to increase consumers’ price elasticity of demand by a factor of three 
over consumers receiving price information alone when presented with a price increase consistent with 
dynamic pricing during critical peak periods. Consumers with access to information about consumption 
quantities in addition to price information demonstrated both a learning effect and habit formation that 
extended beyond the specific pricing events. 
3. Electricity Pricing – A Market Inefficiency 
Retail electricity prices in virtually all U.S. states, especially those for the residential sector, are typically 
a flat charge per kWh consumed – the same price every day of the week and every hour of the day. 
However, the cost of providing that electricity varies by day, time of day, and by month. The result is 
two-fold: some consumers’ consumption habits have an upward influence on overall electricity prices 
                                                     
17 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 USC §6295 
18 Phantom load is the power that devices draw simply by being plugged into the wall, even when not turned on and 
in use. More information on standby power is available at http://standby.lbl.gov 
19 In-home displays used in this experiment provided both the utility and consumers with real-time information 
about prices and usage. 
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while other consumers have a downward impact on overall prices – although it is unlikely that consumers 
would even know into which group they fit. 
a) Peak Pricing 
There are a number of viable alternative to traditional flat-rate pricing that more closely correlate the 
electricity price with the costs of supply, including: critical peak pricing (CPP), time-of-use pricing 
(TOU), and real-time pricing (RTP). All of these pricing approaches lower the price of electricity during 
most hours of the day and increase the price only during times when the cost of supply is highest – the 
closer the peak time price is to the cost of supply, the lower the price during other hours of the day 
(Farqui, 2010). 
Traditional flat-rate pricing is, in several ways, a barrier to increased residential energy efficiency in the 
U.S. Residential consumers have shown some price elasticity of demand in respond to price signals – 
Jessoe and Rapson (2012) found a demand response of 7% to simulated CPP price signals delivered one 
day ahead, and another study identified a demand reduction of 1% to 2% in response to hourly real-time 
pricing (Allcott, 2011b). Interestingly, both of these studies reported that energy conservation in response 
to price signals did not result in increased consumption during other times – residential consumers 
actually reduced consumption as opposed to merely shifting load from peak hours to off-peak hours. 
Another way in which flat-rate pricing inhibits residential energy savings is the misallocation of benefits 
from reduced energy consumption. Consumers who reduce consumption during peak demand times do 
not receive the market value of these energy savings. Consider the chart shown in Figure 3 (Newell & 
Faruqui, 2009) from a report on dynamic pricing in the New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO) region which shows several periods during which the electricity price would have briefly risen 
well above $1.00/kWh. Residential consumers on a flat-rate pricing schedule who reduced their 
consumption during these times would provide system-wide savings of about $1.10/kWh, but would 
themselves only accrue savings at the flat rate of about $0.18/kWh.  
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Figure 3 - Comparison of Flat and Dynamic Rates for Residential Customers in New York City (Newell & Faruqui, 
2009) 
Actual savings could be substantial, not just to the consumer who reduces electricity consumption during 
peak hours under an electricity pricing schedule that more closely mirrored the marginal cost of electricity 
generation, but also to all consumers as reducing peak demand would drive overall costs downward. In 
states where the electricity market remains fully regulated (i.e., no competition), new approaches are 
being adopted to stimulate utilities to encourage energy efficiency that entail the utility being 
compensated for both efficiency program costs and some portion of the electricity they would otherwise 
have sold, via a method called decoupling (York, Witte, Nowak, & Kushler, 2012). 
b) Role of Technology in Price Response 
The structure of electricity pricing is a barrier 1) to consumers having a price signal to which they can 
respond, and 2) to consumers directly receiving the benefits they produce by conserving energy. 
However, dynamic pricing structures require the installation of advanced metering infrastructure as a 
basic precursor to adoption. Currently, the FERC estimates that less than 20% of electric meters in the 
U.S. are advanced meters and capable of communication (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2011). 
Without consumer access to real-time price information and utility access to real-time electricity 
consumption, dynamic pricing mechanisms are not possible. 
Furthermore, consumers also need technology that enables them to actually respond to price signals. 
Possibly some form of automated home control device that could be pre-programmed to turn off or 
restrict operation of certain equipment given a price signal pre-determined by the consumer. Technology 
such as home area networks (HANs) are early-stage rudimentary examples of this concept, and even at 
the start of the technology’s lifecycle are producing savings on residential electricity bills of 15% to 20% 
in utility territories across the nation (Sulavik, 2010).  
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4. Financing Mechanisms 
Financing is a key aspect of EPCs, and the entry of commercial lenders into the efficiency market 
supported rapid expansion of ESCOs. However, the entry of commercial lenders added another facet to 
the EPC business model – credit risk. The ESCO has the expertise to guarantee savings and accept the 
performance risk, but when third-party financing enters the equation a “hell-or-high-water” payment 
provision often enters the picture under which commercial lenders expect repayment of the outstanding 
debt obligation whether or not the project performs as expected (Freehling, 2011). 
Freehling (2011) provides many examples of government-backed loans and grants, community 
development corporations, credit unions, non-profit organizations, and state and local government funded 
programs which are acting to reduce the credit risk that attaches to major upgrades undertaken by 
residential and other small-scale energy efficiency projects. These programs typically do one of several 
things: 1) capitalize loan funds which are administered by government agencies, non-profits or utilities, 2) 
provide loan guarantees to loan funds capitalized by other parties (e.g., ratepayer-funded programs like 
PBFs, grants, etc.), or 3) provide seed funding to support start-up revolving loan funds. 
However, even with these innovations in financing structures, economies of scale impose transaction 
costs that remain prohibitive. Consider that the most common sources of efficiency upgrades – lighting 
and HVAC systems – may represent several thousand dollars at their maximum level. As Freehling 
(2011) describes, even a multi-family housing building with 100 units would be unlikely to require 
investment of more than $500,000 – about 10% of what is considered a small project on the scale of 
commercial lenders, and paltry compared to the $25-$30 million in annual loan originations the largest of 
these financiers target. To provide for increased scale some communities and states have sought bond 
issues to establish efficiency funds. 
Other efforts to address this scale obstacle are focused on diversifying the origin of loan funds – allowing 
utilities to provide on-bill financing for customers or allowing customers to finance energy efficiency 
improvements on their property tax bill through a method called property assessed clean energy financing 
(PACE). These efforts are also being streamlined by engaging credit union, community banks, and non-
profit finance organizations that are stakeholders in their local communities and who are not beholden to 
large shareholder interests to manage and underwrite these loans. However, these approaches are not 
without their challenges as well; for instance, there has been resistance from mortgage owners 
(particularly federally backed mortgages through the Federal Housing Authority) regarding PACE 
financing as the primary mortgage becomes subordinate to the energy efficiency loan, and efforts to allow 
financing of energy efficiency improvements through charges levied on electric bills, called on-bill 
financing, also face numerous issues such as whether the utility and customer are jointly and severally 
liable for the loan or whether the loan attaches to the meter and would change hands with the deed to the 
property. 
B. Two Keys to Approaching Residential Energy Efficiency 
Residential energy savings is possible, as recent studies have demonstrated. The main barriers are access 
to information and incentivizing consumer response to both knowledge and price. Residential energy 
savings require an approach oriented towards the residential market which involves: advanced metering 
and controls technology as well as value to the customers more representative of the actual benefits 
engendered by residential activity. 
1. Automated Metering and Smart Grid Technology 
A key aspect of enabling performance-based energy efficiency contracts to succeed is not only the ability 
to accurately and reliably project energy savings, but also to measure the actual savings. Until the advent 
of smart grid technology such as automated metering systems this was relatively expensive and not 
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feasible for individual residences. Automated meter data in digital format allows a variety of systems to 
be integrated into the home electrical system, some of which can attach at the appliance level, some can 
be connected through the main electric circuit box, and others can use software algorithms to estimate 
which devices and appliances in a home use how much energy at what time. This level of detailed 
information about energy use allows heretofore unavailable insight into the characteristics of an 
individual home’s energy use, and, similarly to the way better information reduced the transaction costs 
and improved the service of ESCOs in the early generations of performance contracting, this granular 
level of detailed consumption data can be invaluable in minimizing the transaction cost associated with 
estimating a home’s potential energy savings. 
This opportunity is not without its challenges as well, however. A major challenge in some states is 
privacy – many utilities are prohibited from allowing third-party access to consumption data about 
individual accounts, even with permission from the account holder. Also, many smart-grid and automated 
meter systems being deployed are not focused on providing functionality for increasing energy efficiency 
or managing demand as a resource, but instead are being adopted partly as a method of upgrading decades 
old equipment, reducing utility meter-reading costs and improving response time in the event of grid 
outages or other disruptions, and also to proactively prevent outages by measuring infrastructure 
performance and identifying problems before they reach a critical point of failure.  
2. Efficiency as a Supply-Side Resource 
Finally, the goal of managing demand as a resource equivalent to generation which was first articulated in 
1978 with the enactment of PURPA is slowly creeping towards realization more than three decades later. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in a final rule20 promulgated in March of 2011, articulated 
the “net benefits test” for determining when demand-side resources must be compensated for the service 
provided to the energy market at the market price for energy in competitive wholesale markets. This rule 
provides a revised framework that requires demand-side management resources to be accepted into 
competitive wholesale markets for electricity and compensated on par with supply-side generation, 
remedying longstanding inequities for efficiency in the marketplace. 
Although the required filings by transmission operators have a deadline of Fall 2012 and the details or 
acceptability of each RTO or ISO plan is far from settled, the groundwork has been laid for energy 
efficiency to not merely be a source of reduced cost but for energy efficiency to become a source of 
revenue. For the residential segment, this change in the market’s regulatory structure could increase the 
rate of return, provide compensation for energy conservation at the marginal cost of electricity, and 
reduce credit risks associated with efficiency financing. 
This single change, when coupled with greater information about energy consumption patterns by small-
scale consumers and the two-way interface made possible through automated metering and smart-grid 
technology could vastly change the landscape of energy efficiency and fundamentally alter the prospects 
for performance-based contracting in the residential sector. Combined, these new trends may offer 
increased access to finance for small-scale energy consumers, the technological capability for electricity 
consumption that is responsive to both real-time price and overall power system load, and together may 
represent the final piece of the puzzle for new EPC-like business models created to aggregate residential 
DSM technologies so that a neighborhood becomes the market equal to the power plant, and so that 
conserving energy isn’t only a source of savings but is also a source of revenue. 
                                                     
20 18 CFR Part 35; Order No. 745, FERC Docket No. RM 10-17-000, Issued March 15, 2011 
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VI. Conclusion 
The traditional EPC approach in ineffective in the residential market due to several aspects of the 
residential energy consumer, specifically: 
- Residential consumers lack scale, both in per-unit consumption and in the number of readily 
identifiable homogenous units; 
- Residential consumers lack the necessary energy intensity [on a square-foot basis] to justify 
investment within the structure of present-day EPC business models; and, 
- Consumption in the residential sector is driven by different factors than in other sectors.  
However, despite some long-held beliefs, residential consumers can exhibit price-elastic demand for 
energy, and can successfully modify behavior and habits to increase energy conservation. A number of 
recent studies – made possible by advanced meters, in-home displays, and home area networks – have 
demonstrated that residential consumers exhibit a small response to both price signals and information 
related to their social standing, but when provided with feedback on consumption quantity and how their 
actions affect energy consumption in real time residential consumers can substantially reduce 
consumption. Furthermore, price and quantity data coupled with real-time feedback has produced a 
learning effect resulting in savings additional to those directly stimulated by a price signal and indicate 
the potential for the formation of energy conservation habits. 
Performance contracting in the residential sector requires a different business model than the ESCO 
industry has traditionally employed. The main advantage of residential consumers is their flexibility of 
energy usage and the large number of users who could potentially enact a conservation response. Unlike 
traditional EPC models, residences typically lack the necessary scale to justify investments on the basis of 
energy savings, but rather with limited capital investment and retrofit activities, the residential segment 
can be called upon as a supply resource. 
Ultimately, the same characteristics that make the residential segment difficult to target and set it apart 
from other segments in energy conservation efforts are the attributes that must be leveraged for energy 
savings value – disaggregated demand, unique economic valuation and utility perspectives, and individual 
capacity to learn and respond to stimuli. The three fundamental requirements to tap into this potential for 
increased energy savings are: 
1. Access to information on price, quantity, effects of behavioral changes, and social norms; 
2. Technology to enable price responses, demand and consumption control, and greater consumer 
autonomy and independence in managing energy consumption; and, 
3. Motivation to change behaviors and invest time and effort in the form of individual feedback, 
economic incentives, and comparative social feedback.  
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